Thesis · 2024
A Framework to Weaponize Risk
Targeting an opponent’s supply-chain vulnerabilities. Charles University, Department of Security Studies.
Research
Fulcrum began with a question most supply-chain risk practice avoids: can risk be induced deliberately, and can market data show where the leverage sits? The answer became a framework, a case study, and eventually a platform.
The original research
Fulcrum is developed by Synthetic Risk LLC. The research began at Charles University with a question most supply-chain risk practice avoids: if an actor wanted to induce risk, where would they apply pressure, and how would the effect propagate? It focused on critical raw materials: concentrated, hard to substitute, and politically exposed.
The framework groups pressure into five vectors: physical denial, cyber intrusion, sovereign and contractual risk, policy-driven dumping, and political instability. It treats price, volatility, and market behavior as evidence of stress, then looks for leverage points across upstream, midstream, and downstream flows.
The contribution is the lens, not the list. The framework does not claim that every pressure is intentional.
Read the thesis (PDF)The UKTMP case
The UKTMP case study, “Leveraging Risk in Kazakh Magnesium and Titanium Supply-Chains” (2025), applied the qualitative framework to Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant (UKTMP) JSC. It used open-source intelligence only, with an illustrative aerospace offtaker as the problem owner. It preceded the platform: no forecasting stack, no graph, no cost bridge.
The case identified three primary vectors and several sub-vectors: margin pressure, customer dependence, supplier diversification, Trans-Caspian route infrastructure, payment timing, and sanctions-compliance risk. It asked where leverage sits, which dependencies matter, and how pressure would propagate.
It is the origin case. The current platform came later; the Hormuz/Uniper case is the platform case. UKTMP shows the framework can be applied analytically without the software. It is illustrative and does not claim UKTMP’s or the offtaker’s actual exposure. The case study is available on request.
Documents
The thesis is published in full. The UKTMP case study is available on request. Previews load only when requested, so the PDF does not weigh down the page.
Thesis · 2024
Targeting an opponent’s supply-chain vulnerabilities. Charles University, Department of Security Studies.
Case study · 2025
The qualitative UKTMP case study. The public copy is available on request.
References
Public references for the method and the case work. Case-specific artifacts and hashes live with the case.
Next step
We will tell you whether the research applies, what evidence we need, and what the first product would contain.